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Workers’ Compensation.
Lang v. Municipal Employees’
Retirement System of R.I., 222 A.3d 912 (R.I. 2019). The Workers’
Compensation Court (WCC) has jurisdiction over appeals by parties
who had applied for accidental disability retirement allowance and
were subsequently denied.
Further, occupational cancer is
considered a compensable injury, as determined by the WCC’s
interpretation of Rhode Island General Laws section 28-34-2(33)
with the date of disability determined under section 28-34-6.
Finally, the Rhode Island Supreme Court inferred the General
Assembly’s intent that a firefighter must first prove an
occupational cancer exists before receiving occupational cancer
benefits, interpreting that there is no conclusive presumption that
all cancer in firefighters is considered occupational.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

In 1996, Petitioner Kevin Lang (Lang) began his career as a
firefighter for the City of Cranston.1 He had a long and successful
career until September 2012 when his colon cancer diagnosis
suddenly ended his time with the fire department.2 Following this
diagnosis, the City of Cranston “placed him on injured-on-duty
status,” in accord with R.I. General Law section 45-19-1.3 This
allowed Lang to receive salary benefits from the City.4 In January
2014, Lang applied for accidental disability benefits pursuant to
section 45-21.2-9, and, in July 2015, the Retirement Board of the
Municipal Employees Retirement System of Rhode Island (the
Board) denied his application after Lang could not prove that his
cancer arose out of his job as a firefighter.5 Lang then appealed the
decision to the Workers’ Compensation Court (WCC). It is critical
to note that the Board notified him of his ability to appeal only to
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Lang v. Mun. Emps. Ret. Sys. of R.I., 222 A.3d 912, 914 (R.I. 2019).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the Rhode Island Superior Court, but Lang chose to appeal to the
WCC, claiming that section 45-21.2-9(f) gave the Workers’
Compensation Court subject matter jurisdiction.6
The Municipal Employees’ Retirement System of Rhode Island
(the Respondent) filed a motion to dismiss Lang’s appeal, claiming
that the WCC lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that his claim
should be filed in the Superior Court, as they originally suggested.7
That motion was swiftly denied by the trial judge.8
Lang filed a motion for summary judgment in the WCC,
asserting that section 45-19.1-1 offered the complete presumption
that all cancers contracted by firefighters are related to their
employment.9 Petitioner included three affidavits from Lang,
Raymond Chaquette, M.D. (Lang’s oncologist), and the Chief of the
Cranston Fire Department, which served to establish Lang’s long
employment as a firefighter, his cancer diagnosis, and his
placement on injured-on-duty status.10 Among other records,
reports from five physicians noted that Lang was permanently
disabled but the physicians could not conclusively state that Lang’s
cancer resulted from his employment.11
In a written decision, the trial court judge reversed the Board’s
determination and stated that section 45-19.1-1(b) “creates a
conclusive presumption that all cancer in firefighters . . . arises out
of and in the course of their employment” and granted Lang
The Respondent
accidental disability retirement benefits.12
appealed to the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division
affirmed the trial judge’s ruling that the WCC had subject matter
jurisdiction to hear the claim regarding whether section 45-19.1-1
created a total presumption that a cancer diagnosis in firefighters
arises out of and in the course of their employment.13 The
Respondent sought reversal of the WCC decree, contending the
WCC did not have subject matter jurisdiction and the above listed
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 913.
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chapter of the general laws did not allow for the presumption that
all cancer in firefighters arises out of their employment.14 The
Respondent filed a writ of certiorari, which the Rhode Island
Supreme Court granted.15
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

A review of certiorari is “limited to an examination of the record
to determine if an error of law has been committed.”16 On review,
the record should be inspected beyond just searching for judicial
error(s) to identify any legally competent evidence to “support
findings of the hearing of justice.”17 The Supreme Court performed
a review of the questions of statutory interpretation de novo,
allowing the Court to give effect to the “purpose of the act as
intended by the legislature.”18 Justice Indeglia further explained
that “when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, this
Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words
of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings,” but when the
language is ambiguous, the Court turns to “well-established
maxims of statutory construction” to determine legislative intent.19
Finally, the Court noted that it would not construe a statute in a
way that reaches an absurd result.20
Under this standard of review, the Supreme Court analyzed
several statutory provisions relating to this case.21
A. Relevant Statutes
Because the Court was tasked with determining the interplay
between several statutory provisions, the Court provided an
overview of the relevant statutes. First, section 45-19-1 generally
grants salary benefits to firefighters injured on duty.22 Subsection
14. Id.
15. Id. at 914.
16. Id. at 914–15 (quoting Plante v. Stack, 109 A.3d 846, 853 (R.I. 2015)).
17. Id. at 915 (quoting Plante, 109 A.3d at 853).
18. Id. (quoting Bluedog Capital Partners, L.L.C. v. Murphy, 206 A.3d 694,
699 (R.I. 2019)).
19. Id. (quoting In re B.H., 194 A.3d 260, 264 (R.I. 2018)).
20. Id. (quoting In re B.H., 194 A.3d at 264).
21. Id.
22. Id.
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(j) was created to provide an amendment clarifying that any person
receiving such benefits should apply for an accidental disability
retirement allowance within eighteen months of injury at the risk
of losing their injured-on-duty benefits should they neglect that
obligation.23 Subsection two of section 45-19-1(j) clarifies that
injured-on-duty payments will terminate in the event that the
WCC, in a final ruling, allows accidental disability payments.24
Next, section 45-21.2-9 provides the aforementioned accidental
disability retirement allowance benefits to firefighters who are in
need due to a mental or physical injury sustained while in the line
of duty.25 An amendment to this statute, subsection (f), provides
that if a party is “aggrieved by the determination of the retirement
board pursuant to § 45-19-1,” that party may appeal to the Rhode
Island WCC.26 Finally, section 45-19.1—“Cancer Benefits for Fire
Fighters”—provides certain benefits to firefighters diagnosed with
a “disabling occupational cancer.”27
B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
In reviewing whether the WCC had subject matter
jurisdiction,28 the Court conducted a de novo review.29 Respondent
raised three arguments supporting his claim that the WCC did not
have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the appeals.30 First,
Respondent argued that the Appellate Division of the WCC “erred
when it affirmed the trial [j]udge’s determination” that the WCC
had subject matter jurisdiction because the unambiguous language
in section 45-21.2-9 allows the WCC jurisdiction when the Board
has made a determination pursuant to section 45-19-1 only,
whereas here, the Board’s decision was based on section

23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. (quoting 45 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-21.2-9).
27. Id. at 916 (quoting 45 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-19.1-3(a)).
28. A challenge to subject matter jurisdiction questions the “very power of
the court to hear the case” and is reviewed de novo. Id. (quoting Sullivan v.
Coventry Mun. Emps’ Ret. Plan, 203 A.3d 483, 487 (R.I. 2019)).
29. Id. (quoting Sullivan, 203 A.3d at 487).
30. Id.
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45-21.2-9.31 The Court rejected Respondent’s argument.32 The
Court determined that the WCC had jurisdiction over the appeals
rendered by the Board, so long as the appeal was filed pursuant to
the time mandate in section 45-19-1(j), as was the intent of the
General Assembly.33 The Court stated the statute must not be
construed so literally as to result in absurdities or a defeating
purpose of the enactment.34 The Court further explained that to
accept Respondent’s argument would be tantamount to
determining that the General Assembly created an appeal
opportunity that would have no effect because the “board will never
render a decision pursuant to § 45-19-1.”35 The Court found that
this would result in an absurd result that would contradict the
General Assembly’s intent.36 Furthermore, the Court interpreted
the General Assembly’s intent so as to give the WCC jurisdiction
over appeals by parties who applied for an accidental disability
retirement allowance and were denied by the board by pointing to
section 45-19-1(j) to reveal that the statute is unambiguous in
instructing a person to apply for such allowance from the state
under section 45-21.2-9, and to await the Board’s decision, which
they may appeal pursuant to section 45-21.2-9(f), not section
45-19-1.37 Finally, the Court pointed to section 28-30-1(a), which
“grants the WCC jurisdiction that may be necessary to carry out its
duties,” into which appeals would fall.38
Second, the Respondent argued that the WCC lacked
jurisdiction because occupational cancer and injury are different,
and occupational cancer is not an injury within the meaning of
The Respondent claimed that section
section 45-21.2-9.39
45-21.2-9(a) provides accidental disability retirement allowance for
injury but section 45-21.2-9(f) allows such allowance for
occupational cancer and states that, if the General Assembly

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
See id. (quoting O’Connell v. Walmsley, 156 A.3d 422, 428 (R.I. 2007)).
See id. at 917.
See id.
See id. at 916.
Id.
See id. at 917 (quoting § 45-19-1(j)(2)).
Id. (citing O’Connell v. Walmsley, 156 A.3d 422, 426 (R.I. 2007)).
Id.
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intended the two to be the same, they would have written it as
such.40 The Court rejected the Respondent’s argument and
determined that the General Assembly intended occupational
cancer to be considered an injury for the purposes of WCC appeal
provisions.41 The Court noted that the Respondent was not wrong
in the assertion that the relevant statutory sections do provide
allowance for injury and occupational cancer separately, however
the Court stated section 45-21.2-9(e) provides that an applicant is
entitled to “all of the benefits provided for” in the chapter.42 The
Court reasoned that this interpretation allows an applicant with
occupational cancer to receive the benefits reserved for an “injured”
applicant.43 The Court found further support for its interpretation
in section 28-35-11, which provides that “all questions arising
under . . . Rhode Island general law § 45-21.2-9 shall . . . be
determined by the Workers’ Compensation Court.”44 With no
language that unequivocally states that appeals concerning
occupational cancer are to be treated differently, the Court
concluded that the General Assembly “intended to provide the WCC
with jurisdiction.”45
Third, the Respondent argued that the WCC erred in
identifying cancer as an occupational disease and in considering the
date of diagnosis the date of injury.46 The Respondent looked to
section 45-21.2-9(j) and claimed the WCC was only granted
authority to use “case-management procedures and disputeresolution processes, but not its substantive law, in determining an
appeal.”47 The Court, again, rejected this argument concluding
that it is a far too rigid and hyper-technical interpretation of the
statute.48 The Court reasoned that the aforementioned statute
requires that all proceedings within the WCC must be filed

40. Id.
41. Id. at 918.
42. Id. at 917 (quoting § 45-21.2-9(e)).
43. See id.
44. Id. at 917–18 (quoting 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-35-11).
45. See id. at 918.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. (citing In re B.H., 194 A.3d 260, 264 (R.I. 2018); O’Connell v.
Walmsley, 156 A.3d 422, 428 (R.I. 2007)).
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pursuant to the statute and are subject to the provisions of chapters
29-38.49 However, the statute “contains no limiting language” that
the General Assembly could have included had that been their
intention and, therefore, the Court construed the General
Assembly’s intent to be that appeals filed with the WCC pursuant
to section 45-21.2-9(j) are “not limited to case-management
procedures only.”50 Therefore, the WCC had properly ensured its
jurisdiction and properly determined that occupational cancer is a
compensable injury with the date of injury as the date of diagnosis,
according to sections 28-34-2(33) and 28-34-6, respectively.51
Consequently, the Court affirmed the decree that the WCC had
jurisdiction to hear the Petitioner’s appeal.52
C. Conclusive Presumption
Regarding conclusive presumption, the Respondent argued
that the WCC “erred when it determined that § 45-19.1-1 creates a
conclusive presumption that any diagnosis of cancer among
firefighters is an “occupational cancer.”53 The Respondent asserted
that the General Assembly did not intend to create a conclusive
presumption because there is no language expressly creating such
presumption, as seen in other statutes.54 Furthermore, the
Respondent maintained that the phrase “occupational cancer”
would be redundant and meaningless, and the General Assembly
has elsewhere created presumptions for health impairments of
firefighters and assigned that duty to municipalities.55 The Court
agreed with the Respondent’s argument, holding that section.
45-19.1 does not contain a conclusive presumption that all cancers
in firefighters are occupational cancers.56 The Court determined
that, in order to show that a firefighter is unable to perform his or
her duties because of an occupational cancer, as required by section
45-19.1-3, the firefighter must prove a causal connection between
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. (quoting § 45-21.2-9(j)(2)).
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 919.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 922.
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the disease and his or her employment as a firefighter.57 The Court
explained that this means the cancer must have arisen out of the
Respondent’s employment via exposure to poisons, toxins, chemical
substances, smoke,58 or other harsh conditions that many
firefighters are exposed to, according to section 45-19.1-1(a).59 The
Court further reasoned that by specifically defining “occupational
cancer” in section 45-19.1-2(d) and requiring a firefighter to prove
his or her cancer arose out of the employment, the General
Assembly had no intention of creating a conclusive presumption.60
In staying consistent with the promise not to construe a statute to
reach an absurd result, the Court recognized that the language in
section 45-19.1-1 does not create a conclusive presumption and that
interpreting it to do so would render the statutory definition of
“occupational cancer” meaningless, which would be an absurd
result.61
Finally, the Respondent argued that reliance on the holding in
City of East Providence v. International Association of Firefighters
Local 850 (IAF Local 850), 982 A.2d 1281 (R.I. 2009) was
misplaced.62 The Court agreed with the Respondent’s argument on
this point.63 The Court reasoned that the Court’s task in IAF Local
850 was not to provide an interpretation of section 45-19.1, but
rather “to determine whether the arbitrator exceeded his authority
by rendering an irrational decision,” and, therefore, the Court’s
holding did not determine what type of cancer a firefighter would
have to prove in order to receive occupational cancer disability
benefits.64 Finally, the Court drew the distinction that in the
present case, the Court had to address the interpretation of chapter
19.1 on de novo review.65

57. See id. at 921.
58. Id. (citing § 45-19.1-2(d)).
59. Id.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. Id. at 919.
63. Id.
64. See id. at 920 (citing Providence v. Int’l Assoc. of Firefighters Local
850, 982 A.2d 1281, 1285 (R.I. 2009)).
65. Id.
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D. Justice Robinson’s Concurrence
Justice Robinson concurred with the conclusion reached by the
majority and its interpretation of the relevant statutory
provisions.66 Justice Robinson wrote separately, however, to
reiterate his belief that “there are occasions when it is important
for the General Assembly to speak with stark clarity when it wishes
to enact into law a provision that represents a departure from the
usual.”67 Justice Robinson argued that the Court is required to look
at what the statute actually says rather than to speculate about the
intent of the legislators.68 Accordingly, Justice Robinson stated the
General Assembly must be particularly clear as to its intent so that
the Court can properly apply the statute to the case at hand.69
E. Justice Flaherty’s Opinion: Concurring in Part, Dissenting in
Part
Justice Flaherty concurred in part and dissented in part,
stating that he was in complete agreement with the majority on the
jurisdictional issue.70 However, Justice Flaherty disagreed with
the majority’s conclusion on the conclusive presumption, arguing
that the statutory framework does provide that a diagnosis of
cancer entitles a firefighter to an accidental disability pension.71
Justice Flaherty asserted that section 45-19.101(a) unambiguously
expresses the General Assembly’s intent to have a conclusive
presumption that all cancer in firefighters is caused by the toxins
and dangerous working conditions they are exposed to in the course
of their employment.72 By discussing the effects of exposure to
dangerous toxins as including slowly manifested cancers, Justice
Flaherty argued, the General Assembly must have intended for
cancer in firefighters to be presumed as arising from their
employment.73 Justice Flaherty reasoned that section 45-19.1-1(b)

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 926 (Robinson, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 927.
Id. at 922 (Flaherty, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Id.
See id. at 923.
See id.
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serves as evidence of the General Assembly’s intent to create the
presumption that cancer in firefighters arose out of their
employment where it provides that “the General Assembly finds
and declares that all of the previously stated conditions exist and
arise out of or in the course of their employment,” which serves as
evidence of the General Assembly’s intent to create the
presumption that cancer in firefighters arose out of their
employment.74 Furthermore, Justice Flaherty argued that the
majority, although attempting to distance itself from the language
in IAF Local 850, fell short of that goal because the Court held that
section 45-19.1 was clear and unambiguous and the arbitrator did
not exceed his authority.75
COMMENTARY

In the case at hand, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
acknowledged the importance of properly interpreting the General
Assembly’s legislative intent, doing so de novo.76 As such, the Court
spent ample time reviewing and discussing its processes in coming
to the interpretation that it did for each relevant statutory
provision.77 Further, the Court remained committed to avoiding an
absurd result in any interpretation of statutory language.78 In
doing so, the Court set out to find a balance between proper
interpretation of statutory language and a fair application of the
statutes to both parties. The Court made an impressive effort to
take care to review every relevant statutory provision and to
understand the process by which an appeal of the Retirement Board
of the Municipal Employees’ Retirement System of Rhode Island
decisions must be handled. By reviewing each statutory provision
as necessary, the Court determined that Lang properly appealed to
the Workers’ Compensation Court, holding that the WCC had
subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the General Assembly’s
intent.79

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

See id.
Id. at 925.
See id. at 915.
Id.
See id. at 916.
See id. at 922.
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Regarding the presumption that all cancers in firefighters are
caused by a firefighter’s employment, the Court determined that
there was no such presumption.80 However, the dissenting opinion
brings to light an important consideration—that one statutory
provision, section 45-19.1-1(b), states that any previously stated
condition (cancer included) arises out of the course of a firefighter’s
employment.81 Although the majority did not agree, this
disagreement highlights the importance of balancing a strict and
rigid reading of the statute with the apparent legislative intent of
the General Assembly.
By holding that the WCC had jurisdiction, the Supreme Court
removed any doubt that future appeals could be heard by the WCC.
Additionally, the Supreme Court made it very clear that
firefighters, in order to receive accidental disability retirement
allowance due to a cancer diagnosis, must be able to prove that their
cancer diagnosis arose out of their employment as a firefighter.82
This is a strict standard. However, the majority decision did not
state by what standard of proof or by what means a firefighter could
prove such connection, which could pose challenges for future
petitioners.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the Workers’
Compensation Court had jurisdiction to hear the Petitioner’s appeal
and affirmed the trial court’s decision in relevant part.83 However,
the Court held that section 45-19.1 contains no conclusive
presumption that all cancer in firefighters is an “occupational
cancer.”84 Therefore, the Court reversed the trial court’s decision

80. Id.
81. See id. at 923.
82. See id. at 921.
83. Id. at 922.
84. Id. The Rhode Island legislature recently amended the statute at issue
in this survey to clarify that “[i]f any type of cancer is found in a firefighter,
then it is conclusively presumed to be an occupational cancer arising out of
their employment as firefighters.” See 45 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-19.1-4.
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in regard to the conclusive presumption that all cancer in
firefighters is occupational cancer.
Hannah L. Devoe

